JCPOA 2.0? An Assessment of President Trump’s Ability to Offer Sanctions Relief Through Executive Power Alone (System Ed. Note)

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TURBOFAC Commentary (2703 words)

JCPOA 2.0? An Assessment of President Trump’s Ability to Offer Sanctions Relief Through Executive Power Alone

In the runup to what may (or very well may not) be an agreement between the United States and Iran involving sanctions relief, we’re adding a technical take to the conversation about what a deal could look like. More specifically, this note addresses the scope of relief that the President, without the approval of Congress but assuming there’s no veto-proof majority in opposition, could offer. This note does not address the question of what kinds of sanctions relief may be politically or strategically desirable, either from the perspective of the U.S. or Iranian sides. Our contribution is limited to an accounting of the President’s options.

a) High-level Takeaways

Notwithstanding that existing legislation may require President Trump to submit any nuclear and sanctions related agreement with Iran to Congress, absent...