Civil Enforcement Information - Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation

Date issued: Oct. 30 2010

TURBOFAC Commentary (185 words)

Notes:

1) Demonstrates that for destinations that are still service embargoed, such as Crimea or Syria, a bank's involvement in any aspect of a trade-related transaction may be considered an "export" of a financial service to that destination, even without general prohibitions as broad as that of the CACR or the ITSR (e.g. 560.206).

2) Irregular fact pattern in which a foreign non-U.S. branch routes a payment through New York, but where there is no evidence that the non-U.S. entity caused the U.S. entity to violate the law, e.g. by stripping or otherwise removing information that would have permitted the U.S. entity to discern whether the transaction was permissible. This apparently still constitutes a foreign person "causing" a primary sanctions violation from abroad.

3) It is not clear why this was considered an export of a service "to Sudan," rather than the facilitation of an underlying trade transaction. Presumably the transactions were effected on or behalf of a Sudanese person. In this case, it would appear that there was a degree of interaction between SMBC/NY and the Sudanese L/C issuers.