Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court (Executive Order, Feb. 7, 2025)

Date issued: Feb. 06 2025

TURBOFAC Commentary (439 words)

Notes:

1) Following the January 20, 2025 "Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions (Executive Order Jan. 20, 2025)", which appeared aimed at resurrecting EO 13928 through a recission of the EO that revoked EO 13928, this EO leaves no doubt that there is an active sanctions program concerning the International Criminal Court. The designation criteria are largely similar to the EO 13928 criteria, but there are a few changes to the scope reflected in section 8(d) (defining "protected person").

The designation criteria in this EO are regular, with certain “primary” designation criteria not of interest to the typical legitimate commercial actor, along with the standard “derivative designation” criteria, i.e. “materially assisting” blocked persons, acting on behalf of blocked persons and being owned or controlled by blocked persons. For comments on the administration of those standard designation criteria, refer to General Note on Secondary Sanctions and “Derivative Designation” Criteria; Identification of the Gap Between the Theoretical and Practical Scopes of Authorities Targeting Transactions with no U.S. Nexus; Enforcement Risk Management (System Ed. Note).

2) Section 8(c) says the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including a foreign branch, subsidiary, or employee of such entity), or any person lawfully in the United States. The blocking requirement therefore applies to "subsidiaries" of U.S. persons (subsidiary isn't defined) as is the case in teh Iran and Cuba contexts, as well as non-U.S. person individual employees of such entities (there is no other sanctions program where this is the case). For the time being this definition is not significant because no sanctions have been imposed pursuant to the EO, and is likely a mistake.

In all likelihood, the reason that OFAC is taking this expansive approach to “United States person” is because the definition of “United States person” is meaningful for the scope of “protected persons” the prosecution of which can result in the imposition of sanctions. Given the context of the EO, it would make sense for OFAC to want to protect (say) non-U.S. person employees of military contractors acting outside of the U.S. The fact that the definition covers persons “lawfully in the United States” (as opposed to just “in the United States”) also points to the irregular aspects of the definition being driven by the scoping of “protected persons,” rather than the range of people who are required to comply with the prohibitions. As a result, this is the only blocking prohibition that individuals illegally in the U.S. are evidently not required to comply with.