U.S. Sanctions Target Cuba’s Military Regime, Elites
Press Statement
Marco Rubio, Secretary of State
May 7, 2026
The Trump Administration is taking decisive action to protect U.S. national security and deprive Cuba’s communist regime and military of access to illicit assets. Today, I designated the following actors under President Trump’s Executive Order 14404 of May 1, 2026, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to United States National Security and Foreign Policy”:
GRUPO DE ADMINISTRACION EMPRESARIAL S.A. (GAESA), pursuant to section 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404, for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Cuban economy.
ANIA GUILLERMINA LASTRES MORERA (LASTRES), pursuant to section 2(a)(i)(E) of E.O. 14404, for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of GAESA.
MOA NICKEL SA (MNSA), pursuant to section 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404 for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Cuban economy.
These sanctions are part of the Trump Administration’s comprehensive campaign to address the pressing national security threats posed by Cuba’s communist regime and hold accountable the regime and those who provide it material or financial support. Just 90 miles from the American homeland, the Cuban regime has brought the island to ruin and auctioned off the island as a platform for foreign intelligence, military and terror operations. Additional designations can be expected in the following days and weeks.
BACKGROUND
GAESA, a Cuban military-controlled umbrella enterprise, is the heart of Cuba’s kleptocratic communist system. Controlling an estimated 40 percent or more of the island’s economy, GAESA is involved in various sectors of the Cuban economy and is designed to generate income not for the Cuban people, but only for the benefit of its corrupt elites. While the Cuban people suffer from hunger, disease and chronic under-investment in critical infrastructure such as its power grid, much of the proceeds of GAESA’s activities are funneled away to hidden overseas bank accounts. According to recent public estimates, GAESA’s revenues are likely more than three times the state’s budget, and GAESA likely controls up to $20 billion in illicit assets.
Lastres, the Executive President of GAESA, is responsible for the management of GAESA’s illicit assets held internationally.
MNSA, a joint venture between Sherritt International Corporation and the Cuban state-owned La Compania General de Niquel, has exploited Cuba’s natural resources to benefit the regime at the expense of the Cuban people. It profits from assets that were originally expropriated by the Cuban regime from U.S. persons and corporations.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s sanctions related actions, and in accordance with Executive Order 14404 of May 1, 2026, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy,” all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, all entities and individuals that have ownership, either directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.
All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Foreign persons that engage in transactions with persons designated pursuant to E.O. 14404 – or that operate in the energy, defense and related materiel, metals and mining, financial services, or security sector of the Cuban economy, as identified in E.O. 14404 – are themselves at risk of sanctions. Non-U.S. persons, including foreign financial institutions, should proceed with caution in any dealings with a party sanctioned under this authority. Actions to return assets to a sanctioned party or transfer them to another jurisdiction for potential use by the target could expose non-U.S. persons to significant sanctions risk. All property and interests in property of persons that are blocked pursuant to the CACR continue to be blocked. The CACR prohibits persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest, unless authorized or exempt.
The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.
Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to: [email protected]. Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.
State’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14404, which authorizes sanctions on Cuban regime officials responsible for repression and threats to U.S. national security. This action also furthers both E.O. 14380, “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba” and National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 (NSPM-5), which directs the Executive Branch to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba.
1) This is the first designation notice issued under EO 14404. While it does not include designations that would qualify as “secondary sanctions” enforcement actions as described in Introductory Note Common to all Derivative Designation Notices ("De Facto" Secondary Sanctions) Included in the Research System (System Ed. Note)), the notice is nonetheless notable insofar as the “Sanctions Implications” section appears to signal that the targeting risk under the EO is concentrated in “engag[ing] in transactions with persons designated pursuant to E.O. 14404 – or [] operat[ing] in the energy, defense and related materiel, metals and mining, financial services, or security sector of the Cuban economy, as identified in E.O. 14404.” Strictly speaking, any transaction involving the provision of goods or services to a “Government of Cuba” person is sanctionable under the material support provision in EO 14404, and a significant question is whether and to what extent OFAC intends on using that provision as a quasi secondary sanctions provision (as it intends to do with “operating in”), and to what extent it intend on using it to target GoC entities themselves and otherwise “nefarious” conduct. See generally General Note on Secondary Sanctions and “Derivative Designation” Criteria; Identification of the Gap Between the Theoretical and Practical Scopes of Authorities Targeting Transactions with no U.S. Nexus; Enforcement Risk Management.