Civil Enforcement Information - National Australia Bank

Date issued: Sep. 07 2007

TURBOFAC Commentary (258 words)

Notes:

This enforcement action was based on actions prior to the effective date of the "International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act" of 2007, which made it illegal for a person, wherever located, to "cause" a violation of IEEPA. Without this basis for asserting jurisdiction over NAB’s actions taken outside of the U.S. that did not involve one of its own branches, and without a corresponding settlement agreement elaborating the details of the violations and applicable CFR provisions, it is difficult to determine what methods were used for processing payments and what theories of liability OFAC asserted.

In particular, it is impossible to tell whether OFAC asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction over NAB’s actions taken outside of the U.S. Compare the ABN AMRO case—the only other non-U.S. bank settlement made prior to the enhancement act—where OFAC used theories of "facilitation" and "evasion" on the part of the unwitting U.S. branches of ABN AMRO as its bases for fining those U.S. branches of a Dutch bank.

Here, however, the enforcement information extract states that "the majority [of the illicit payments were] processed through correspondent accounts held by [NAB] at other U.S. banks," and it is unclear how if at all OFAC might have asserted jurisdiction over NAB for those particular transactions.

For the transactions processed through NAB's U.S. branches, those branches would have been, at a minimum and even if unwittingly, exporting financial services to Sudan (538.205) and dealing in property in which Cuba had an interest (515.201). The Burma case is less clear absent details regarding the transaction.