COMPL 1000368


SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") is made by and between the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank (CA-CIB).

I. PARTIES

1. OFAC administers and enforces economic sanctions against targeted foreign countries, regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and persons engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among others. OFAC acts under Presidential national emergency authorities, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction.

2. CA-CIB is headquartered in Paris, organized under the laws of France, and is the corporate and investment banking arm of Credit Agricole S.A. (CASA).

II. FACTUAL STATEMENT

3. For a number of years, up to and including 2008, CA-CIB (formerly known as Calyon) and certain of its predecessor banks, and CA-CIB's subsidiary located in Switzerland, Credit Agricole (Suisse) S.A., and its predecessors –including Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., and Credit Agricole Indosuez (Suisse) S.A. –processed thousands of transactions to or through U.S. financial institutions that involved countries and/or persons (individuals and entities) subject to the sanctions regulations administered by OFAC. Personnel (including managers) from various business units within these CA-CIB entities were aware of U.S. economic sanctions programs and understood that U.S. financial institutions were required to block or reject transactions involving an OFAC-sanctioned country or person. Despite this knowledge, the above-referenced banks used cover payments and/or implemented special payment practices in a manner that omitted references to U.S.-sanctioned parties in U.S. Dollar (USD) Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) payment messages sent to the United States, thereby preventing U.S. financial institutions from appropriately reviewing and analyzing the transactions for compliance with OFAC regulations.

A. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A.

4. In June 2003, CASA purchased Credit Lyonnais, a bank headquartered in France with a subsidiary operating in Switzerland known as Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A. ("CLS"). Between 2003 and March 2005 - the date in which CLS merged with a CA-CIB subsidiary in Switzerland known as Credit Agricole Indosuez (Suisse) S.A. to fonn Credit Agricole (Suisse) S.A. - CLS processed thousands of transactions to or through the United States in apparent violation of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR). Beginning as early as 2003, CLS maintained correspondent accounts for, and processed USD transactions on behalf of, 11 Sudanese banks - including five banks identified by OFAC as being owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan, and one bank that was majority-owned by a Specially Designated National (SDN) and therefore automatically blocked by operation of law. These Sudanese institutional clients constituted the majority of CLS's correspondent banking business from the beginning of the review period in 2003 until CLS's merger with Credit Agricole Indosuez (Suisse) S.A. in 2005.

5. On November 3, 1997, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13067, "Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan" (E.O. 13067). Following the issuance of E.O. 13067, CLS became aware of, and took several steps in response to, the sanctions imposed against Sudan. For example, on November 9, 1997, one of CLS's Sudanese institutional clients sent a Telex message to all of its correspondents (including CLS) informing the banks of the sanctions imposed against Sudan and requested its correspondents "not to [] channel such transactions by intermediation of any U.S.A. bank, including banks domiciled in the U.S.A. territory, U.S.A. banks overseas branches and subsidiaries [or the] [a]ffiliates of[a] U.S.A. bank incorporated outside the United States." A handwritten note on the Telex message - written by a CLS Senior Commercial Bank Manager ("Employee 1") - stated that the instructions contained in the message were to be relayed to CLS departments and applied to all Sudanese banks.

6. A few days later, on November 11, 1997, Employee 1 sent an internal memorandum to a CLS operations analyst with the following instructions: "Please add Sudan to the list of countries under U.S. embargo where the embargo took effect on November 5, 1997 and distribute [an updated version of the attached] memorandum...." The memorandum attached an internal note that contained the following instructions for payments involving "countries under U.S. embargo," which included Cuba, Iran, and Sudan:

All transfer transactions, FOREXITREASURY and/or documentary transactions are subject to the embargo. All funds in USD in transit to US banks, referring to governmental and non-governmental entities, as well as individuals residing in the above-mentioned countries are legally blocked. Sanctions being currently in effect, it is strictly prohibited [emphasis original] to pass by a U.S. correspondent, or by [Credit Lyonnais] New York.

7. On November 13, I997, a CLS Senior Commercial Bank Manager (Employee 1), a CLS Senior Legal Manager, and a CLS Legal Manager ("Employee 38") received a telex message from Credit Lyonnais's New York branch which stated: "Kindly be advised that all payments to Sudanese entities or persons are subject to be blocked in accordance with OFAC regulations...." On November 18, 1997, Credit Lyonnais's Head Office sent a message to a CLS Senior Front Office Manager and Employee l with instructions related to transactions involving Sudan. "Following United States Sanctions (Office of Foreign Assets Controls), against Sudan, it is compulsory, until further instructions, not to execute none [sic] of our customer's payment orders towards the United States, in favor of Sudanese banks or/and others Sudanese companies."

8. Personnel and management in various components ofCLS had actual knowledge of the sanctions regulations administered by OFAC, and that U.S. financial institutions were required to block or reject transactions that involved an OFAC-sanctioned country or person. For example, in a January 10, 2002 email between Employee I and a separate CLS Senior Commercial Bank Manager ("Employee 36"), a CLS Senior Back Office Manager ("Employee 47"), a CLS Trade Finance Manager, a Senior Back Office Manager/Credit Desk, and a CLS Legal Manager (Employee 38) regarding the potential repercussions of U.S. banks freezing transactions on behalf of their clients due to OFAC sanctions, a Senior Commercial Bank Manager stated:

With U.S. OFAC legislation being very strict on the matter, a reimbursement clause on a U.S. bank shall not be accepted in these cases, because even if, first[] we would be credited and after the fact the U.S. bank, having discovered the overall conditions of the transactions, following its awareness of new elements, requests us to return the funds, we would have to oblige if we want to avoid annoying disturbances, and, without a doubt, the funds will be blocked within the framework of the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) legislation set forth above.

9. CLS utilized multiple transaction types and/or payment practices throughout the review period in order to process transactions to or through the United States that were for or on behalf of its Sudanese institutional clients, including: (i) customer transfers; (ii) bank-to-bank transactions utilizing one outbound SWIFT MT202 cover payment; and (iii) bank-to-bank transactions utilizing two outbound SWIFT MT202 cover payments.

10. A majority of the Sudanese-related transactions CLS processed were customer transfers made on behalf of its Sudanese correspondent banks' clients. In general, CLS received payment instructions in the form of a SWIFT MTI 03 payment message requesting that CLS debit the Sudanese bank's USD account on CLS's books and credit the account of a third-country beneficiary at a non-U.S. financial institution. The overwhelming majority of the incoming SWIFT MTI03 payment messages during the review period (approximately 94%) from the Sudanese banks to CLS included instructions to not mention the name of Sudan or any Sudanese parties in the cover payment messages sent to the United States. For example, on June 5, 2004, a Sudanese bank located in Khartoum, Sudan sent CLS a SWIFT MT103 payment message and noted:

DON'T MENTION SUDAN ON THIS PAYMENT ORDER. [ ] PLS SEND DIRECT TO BENEF. BANK. DON'T MENTION BANK NAME ON COVER PAYMENT. DEBITING OUR USD A/C IN YR BOOKS.

Subsequent to receiving the incoming SWIFT MT103 message, CLS would send a SWIFT MT202 payment message to a U.S. clearing bank without including the name of the originating Sudanese financial institution and/or customer.

11. CLS also processed hundreds of bank-to-bank transactions to or through the United States on behalf of its Sudanese institutional clients by using a single SWIFT MT202 cover payment or by using two SWIFT MT202 cover payments. CLS processed 116 bank-to-bank transactions between 2003 and 2005 using a single SWIFT MT202 cover payment. In general, upon receipt of an incoming SWIFT MT202 message from one of its Sudanese institutional clients directing CLS to debit the Sudanese bank's USD account on CLS's books and credit USD to a non-U.S. financial institution, CLS generated an outgoing SWIFT MT202 message destined for a U.S. clearing bank. In all but two of the 116 transactions identified during the review period for this category of transactions, CLS did not include the name, SWIFT Bank Identifier Code, or any other identifying information for the originating Sudanese bank in the originator bank field (SWIFT field 52) in the outbound payment messages sent to the United States. There were two transactions that CLS processed that listed the name of the originating Sudanese bank. in the outgoing SWIFT MT202 message sent to the United States. Although U.S. financial institutions rejected both of the transactions in accordance with U.S. sanctions law, CLS re­ submitted the payments to the same U.S. clearing bank after CLS removed the name and/or reference to the Sudanese bank in the originator bank field (SWIFT field 52) of the payment message. In contrast, CLS included the name of the originating financial institution in 79 of the 85 bank-to-bank transactions it processed during the review period on behalf of its non­ sanctioned institutional clients using a single SWIFT MT202 cover payment.

12. CLS processed the remaining 583 bank-to-bank transactions using two SWIFT MT202 cover payments. In practice, CLS received an incoming SWIFT MT202 message from a Sudanese institutional client instructing CLS to debit the Sudanese bank's USD account on CLS's books and pay USD to a non-U.S., beneficiary financial institution. Subsequent to receiving these instructions, CLS prepared two outgoing SWIFT MT202 payment messages­ one message destined for the U.S. clearing bank that did not reference or identify the Sudanese originating bank, and one message destined for the beneficiary financial institution that did reference the Sudanese bank. During the period of apparent violations by CLS, CLS processed approximately 83% of all Sudanese bank-to-bank transactions with two SWIFT MT202 cover payments, whereas it processed only 11% of its non-sanctioned institutional clients' transactions with two SWIFT MT202 cover payments.

13. Between 2002 and 2004 various CLS personnel received information suggesting that transactions the bank processed through the United States on behalf of its Sudanese clients were in contravention of U.S. sanctions requirements and Credit Lyonnais's internal policy. For example, on July 16, 2002, Credit Lyonnais's Head Office emailed CLS a chart outlining the list of countries under embargo and the various United Nations, European, and OFAC restrictions that applied. The list included Sudan as a country subject to U.S. sanctions and noted "no financial transaction is authorized." Separately, in an email dated October 2, 2003, a Vice President and Compliance Officer at Credit Lyonnais Americas in New York advised various personnel at CLS that transactions processed to or through the United States were subject to the sanctions regulations administered by OFAC: "[U.S.] financial institutions must monitor all financial transactions performed by or through [emphasis original] them to detect those that involve any entity or person subject to the OFAC laws and regulations." In January 2004, a Compliance employee in CLS emailed a Compliance employee in Credit Lyonnais Paris requesting an update to the July 2002 chart, to which the Credit Lyonnais Paris Compliance employee confirmed that there had been no update since the previous communication. Lastly, in 2004, a CLS Senior Back Office Manager at CLS emailed a different CLS Senior Back Office Manager (Employee 47) and another employee informing them that the bank was preparing to install a software filtering tool in order to "ensure that [CLS is] not paying clients featured on the American or European lists." Although the Senior Back Office Manager stated that when processing transactions on behalf of another bank, the originating bank field of outgoing SWIFT payment messages must be populated to show clearly that the originator of the transaction was not a customer of CLS in SWIFT MT103 payments, he/she noted: "This rule is to be applied immediately, the only exception is when a risk of embargo is possible (e.g. payment via debiting from account with [Sudanese Bank 2], and payment to a U.S. bank, even one located in Europe, e.g. [U.S. Financial Institution] London)." Despite these warnings, CLS did not seek clarification or additional guidance regarding its interpretation of U.S. sanctions requirements and, instead, continued to omit or obfuscate the involvement of Sudanese parties in outgoing transactions sent to the United States.

B. CLS Merges with Credit Agricole Indosuez (Suisse) S.A. in Switzerland

14. In April 2004 CASA transferred the corporate and investment banking activities of Credit Lyonnais (including Credit Lyonnais's employees) to Credit Agricole Indosuez (CAI), and CAI was renamed Calyon. CAI maintained a subsidiary in Switzerland known as Credit Agricole Indosuez (Suisse) S.A. ("CAIS"). In March 2005 CLS merged with CAIS to create Credit Agricole (Suisse) S.A. ("CAS"), which remains a CA-CIB subsidiary in Switzerland.

15. In May 2004, Credit Lyonnais's Head Office, upon discovering that CLS maintained a business relationship with a Sudanese bank, sent an email to a member of CAIS's Senior Management and several others in which it stated: "Please note that this counterparty features on the list of banks prohibited by CALYON and we therefore are asking you to kindly terminate any relationship with [the Sudanese bank]." In response to the email which was forwarded to a different member ofCAIS's Senior Management ("Employee 37"), a CLS Senior Commercial Bank Manager (Employee 36), and others, a CLS Senior Commercial Bank Manager (Employee
I) stated the following:

We have had a commercial relationship with [the Sudanese bank], Khartoum, since its creation.... We are one of their principal correspondents in Switzerland (after [Foreign Financial Institution]).... Their considerable liquidity in our books (an average of 10 to 15 million CHF) provides considerable coverage for the commitments as well as for the commercial payments. The anticipated [net banking income] for 2004 is CHF 4 to 500,000.00 with [the Sudanese bank]. It is essential that this relationship be maintained with this bank, that we know very well, that we visit in Sudan and which visits us regularly, and whose employees have for many years now been trained by us on the business of letters of credit/transfers/forex.

16. In addition to Employee 1, Employee 36 (also a CLS Senior Commercial Bank Manager) expressed his disagreement with terminating business relationships with Sudanese parties in various emails and internal communications in June 2004. In an information memorandum addressed to a committee of the Board of Directors of CLS dated June 22, 2004, Employee 36 noted: "Calyon group indicated to us that we have to cease all relationships with [the Sudanese bank] and Sudan. We have appealed this decision (September 11 axis of evil) and thanks to the support of our colleagues [including Employee 85 and Employee 37, both members of CAIS Senior Management]... we think, at a minimum, that we will obtain a 12 month delay which is imperative to help us to leave this file without harm."

17. CA-CIB appears to have maintained a group policy that prohibited its banks from engaging in business with Sudan and/or Sudanese banks. Throughout 2004, prior to the completion of the above-referenced merger, CLS continued to operate correspondent accounts for its Sudanese institutional clients. Based on meeting notes related to a discussion on December 16, 2004 which appear to relate to CLS's Sudanese business, CLS stated "it has been agreed to close down the majority of the accounts, progressively and, if possible, before the merger [with CAIS] on March 19, 2005." The meeting notes stipulated that some accounts would remain open, however. CAS closed all non-Swiss correspondent accounts shortly after the merger between CLS and CAIS 'in May 2005, and conducted its last U.S. dollar transactions related to the Sudanese correspondent accounts the same month.

C. CAIS and CAS

18. Prior to and following the merger with CLS, CAIS (and subsequently CAS) processed transactions to or through the United States in apparent violation of the SSR. Employees within both institutions - including those in the legal and compliance functions - did not believe they were subject to the sanctions programs administered by OFAC. However, certain employees at CAIS and CAS understood that payment messages processed through the United States that included sanctions-identifying information were at risk of being stopped by their U.S. clearers, which could result in payment delays, increased costs, and requests for information that could implicate Swiss banking secrecy. The Legal Department, which was responsible for sanctions compliance issues within CAIS until 2004, determined that CAIS was not subject to non-Swiss sanctions laws (including those administered by OFAC). While CAIS's Legal Department received informal confirmation of its interpretation of U.S. sanctions laws from a regional banking association in 1996 and 2001, certain employees were aware of U.S. sanctions programs and understood that U.S. financial institutions were required to block or reject transactions involving an OFAC sanctioned country or party.

19. In 2004 CAIS transferred the primary responsibility for sanctions compliance to the Monitoring and Investigations Unit ("MOIN"). Although MOIN became the primary point of contact for all of CAIS's business lines and operations units for sanctions related matters, MOIN adopted CAIS's pre-existing understanding regarding the inapplicability of U.S. sanctions laws to non-U.S. persons such as CAIS. As a result, while MOIN required CAIS to forward any and all transactions involving a country subject to Swiss, European Union, and U.S. sanctions to it for review, MOIN repeatedly approved Sudanese and other sanctions related USD transactions that were subsequently processed to or through the United States.

20. MOIN typically received sanctions related transactions for review through email. After receiving such a request, MOIN would generally take the following steps: (a) confirm the transaction complied with Swiss law and did not concern an SON, (b) note that the transaction could be blocked or rejected by a U.S. clearer because it concerned a country subject to OFAC sanctions, (c) suggest the payment be made in another currency, and (d) emphasize the need to make sure the outgoing payment message to the United States did not include any sanctions­ identifying information (e.g., a reference to Sudan or Khartoum).

21. The practice of omitting or removing sanctions-identifying information in outbound USD payment messages appears to have spread to multiple business lines throughout the bank and was noted in a February 2, 2004 notice written by a CAIS Back Office Analyst:

Various payments of ours were stopped by the U.S. banks, because within the text body of our instructions (MTI 03 or 202), certain words such as Iraq, Iran, etc. were used, words which appear on the U.S. Banks [sic] automatic block list. Consequently, be vigilant and do not put too much detailed information in your payments, thus avoiding costly back values.

22. CAIS (and subsequently CAS) continued to receive numerous, albeit indirect, indications that its interpretation of U.S. sanctions laws was incorrect. For example, CA-CIB's New York branch blocked or rejected a number of transactions originated by CAS for processing and provided CAS with additional information regarding U.S. sanctions, informed the Head Office of such issues and suggested additional sanctions related training. Later, on December 1, 2005, a Compliance employee from CA-CIB's Head Office in Paris distributed a memorandum describing the group's policy with regard to Iran. The memorandum included statements suggesting that CAS's understanding of U.S. sanctions was incorrect, including: "Iran is subject to an embargo from OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) of the U.S. Treasury Department. This embargo is applicable directly to all 'US persons' and indirectly to all transactions denominated in USD even when performed out of the United States." Despite receiving these warnings, CAS did not seek clarification from either its Head Office or its New York branch regarding the applicability of OFAC sanctions to CAS.

23. In November 2006, a U.S. financial institution rejected a funds transfer originated by CAS and processed through CA-CIB New York after it determined the goods associated with the underlying transaction were scheduled to be delivered to Port Sudan, Sudan. Neither the SWIFT MT103 payment message nor the SWIFT MT202 cover payment message CAS executed included a reference to Sudan. CA-CIB's Head Office became aware of the rejected transaction and subsequently informed CAS that it needed to focus on the underlying economic purpose of transactions and that Sudanese transactions should not be structured in the same manner as "U­ turn" transactions for Iran. Although a CAS Senior Financial Security Officer initially told the Head Office that he believed its interpretation was incorrect, CAS changed its internal policy with regard to Sudan in January 2007, including disallowing any direct or indirect USD commercial transactions involving Sudan, designating Sudan as a prohibited country in its internal payment system, seeking advice from the bank's Head Office Compliance department for Sudanese-related transactions, and refusing to approve transactions it believed were inconsistent with its new understanding. Despite these changes, MOIN continued to authorize two types of transactions it determined (in consultation with the bank's Head Office Compliance) were authorized and that constituted apparent violations of U.S. sanctions against Sudan: transactions involving the re-sale of Sudanese-origin agricultural goods, or transactions involving the transit of non-Sudanese-origin goods through Sudan.

D. Other CA-CIB Locations

24. While most of the apparent violations involved CA-CIB's subsidiary located in Switzerland and its predecessors, apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), the Burmese Sanctions Regulations (BSR), the SSR, and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) were identified at CA-CIB branches in Paris, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Gulf (Dubai and Bahrain). In contrast to the Sudanese-related transactions processed by CLS, CAIS, and CAS, the apparent violations processed by locations outside of Switzerland do not appear to have been the result of a specific unit within these banks. Nonetheless, despite the group sanctions policies employed by the bank, these CA-CIB locations processed USD transactions to or through U.S. financial institutions by using cover payments. This process, in addition to frequent instructions by CA-CIB personnel to not mention the names of OFAC-sanctioned persons or countries, resulted in the bank processing transactions in a non­ transparent manner and, as a result, prevented U.S. intermediary banks from appropriately reviewing the payments for compliance with OFAC regulations. Although CA-CIB appears to have maintained a group policy addressing transactions involving sanctioned countries, CA-CIB repeatedly misinterpreted OFAC's regulations and, as a result, incorrectly determined that several transactions were authorized or permissible (when, in fact, they were prohibited). These factors appear to have been compounded by a general lack of controls or oversight by the Financial Security department within CASA (which was created in 2004 in order to develop internal controls pertaining to anti-money laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions) and CA­ CIB.

25. Credit Lyonnais maintained a policy dating back to 2002 to utilize cover payments for outgoing USD Iranian-related transactions. In June 2002, Credit Lyonnais New York sent an inquiry to Credit Lyonnais Paris in relation to an outgoing transaction the latter had originated that referenced the ordering party as "one of our customers." Credit Lyonnais Paris's Head Office Financial Security subsequently identified the originator as an Iranian party and sought legal guidance from external counsel. The bank noted that its external counsel drafted a legal memorandum in October 2002 regarding U.S. sanctions laws, including the U-tum rule. Thereafter, Credit Lyonnais' Financial Security department determined that cover payments were part-and-parcel of the U-tum rule and Credit Lyonnais used cover payments to process U­ tums involving Iranian corporate entities. This informal policy was maintained by CA-CIB Financial Security after the merger, as the unit was largely comprised of the former compliance personnel from Credit Lyonnais Paris. As a result, throughout the review period, CA-CIB would
generally process outgoing USD payments on behalf of its Iranian clients by generating a SWIFT MT103 payment message destined for the non-U.S. beneficiary financial institution with complete information related to the transaction's parties, and a SWIFT MT202 cover payment destined for the intermediary U.S. financial institution that did not include the names of any Iranian banks and/or persons.

26. Prior to the merger between Credit Lyonnais and CAI, CAI Paris's branch processed Iranian-related capital market transactions (i.e., treasury and foreign exchange transactions) with direct SWIFT MT202s with the account number of the Iranian bank listed in Field 72. The Paris system would send a SWIFT MT210 (Notice to Receive) message to the U.S. clearing bank which included the SWIFT BIC of the Iranian bank. Following the merger, the bank's Capital Markets unit requested guidance from Head Office Financial Security regarding these types of transactions. In response, the Head Office Financial Security instructed the Capital Markets unit to begin processing its transactions by using cover payments in the same manner described above (i.e., using an outgoing SWIFT MT103 and SWIFT MT202). Although the Capital Markets unit questioned these instructions, the Financial Security department confirmed its instruction, indicating that the use of cover payments for Iranian transactions was supported by the October 2002 legal memo received by external counsel.

27. The practice of utilizing cover payments for Iranian-related payments was not officially adopted as policy until late 2005, in or around the time at which various U.S. regulatory authorities were preparing to announce a settlement with ABN AMRO in response to its violations of U.S. economic sanctions (including several related to Iran). The policy adopted by CA-CIB emphasized that "no mention of Iran" should be "made on the [SWIFT MT202 cover payment.]" The overwhelming majority of the Iranian-related transactions that CA-CIB processed through the United States during the review period appear to have been authorized by the U-tum general license. Sixteen transactions did not meet the terms of the U-tum general license and constituted apparent violations of the ITSR.

28. The majority of the apparent violations of the BSR involved transactions originated by CA-CIB's Hong Kong or Singapore branches. Although the bank was generally aware of the Burmese interest in the payments-either due to the involvement of a Burmese person (individual or entity), goods, or activity undertaken in Burma-the financial institution repeatedly authorized the transactions due to a lack of understanding of the prohibitions contained in the BSR. For example, CA-CIB Hong Kong processed 20 outgoing USD transactions that involved activities in Burma of non-Burmese companies. The transactions were escalated to the bank's Head Office Financial Security, which approved the transactions because none of the counterparties was Burmese or an SDN. An email from a member of CA-CIB's Compliance unit to Head Office Financial Security was identified stating that the payment message routed through the United States would not mention Burma.

29. The apparent violations of the CACR involved multiple CA-CIB locations and often resulted from omitting information or references to Cuba or Cuban parties, misinterpreting OFAC's regulations, or, in one instance, due to a systemic issue with one of the branch's payment systems. For example, CA-CIB Paris made a series of recurring payments to a non­ sanctioned risk participant at its bank account in the United States. These payments related to a sugar-for-oil barter trade finance deal entered into between a predecessor entity of Calyon Bahrain and a Cuban entity owned by the Cuban government. Front office personnel at CA-CIB Paris requested that the payment messages sent to or through the United States not mention Cuba to prevent funds from being attached by creditors of Cuba. At least one employee speculated that the front office's request was in relation to OFAC sanctions. In a few instances, members of CA-CIB Hong Kong's Compliance and Head Office Financial Security discussed that the payment messages sent to the United States should not contain references to Cuba.

30. From on or about August 6, 2003 to on or about September 16, 2008, CA-CIB, including its subsidiaries and their predecessors, processed 4,055 electronic funds transfers in the aggregate amount of$337,042,846 to or through financial institutions located in the United States in apparent violation of the prohibitions against (i) the exportation or reexportation of services from the United States to Sudan, 31 C.F.R. § 538.205; and/or (ii) dealing in property and interests in property of the Government of Sudan that "come within the United States," 31 C.F.R. § 538.201. Of the 4,055 electronic funds transfers, 4,024 electronic funds transfers totaling $317,241,069 were processed by CAS or its predecessors, in particular by CLS.

31. From January 2004 to on or about June 16, 2008, CA-CIB, including its subsidiaries and their predecessors, processed 173 electronic funds transfers in the aggregate amount of $97,195,314 to or through financial institutions located in the United States in apparent violation of the prohibition on dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an internet, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201.

32. From on or about August 15, 2003 to on or about October 20, 2008, CA-CIB, including its subsidiaries and their predecessors, processed 53 electronic funds transfers in the aggregate amount of $7,238,281 to or through financial institutions located in the United States in apparent violation of the prohibition against the exportation or reexportation of financial services to Burma from the United States, 31 C.F.R. § 537.202.

33. From October 2003 to December 2006, CA-CIB, including its subsidiaries and their predecessors, processed 16 electronic funds transfers in the aggregate amount of$397,453 to or through financial institutions located in the United States in apparent violation of the prohibition [REMAINDER IN ORIGINAL PDF]