[Seals of U.S. Departments of State, the Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, Labor, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)]
Africa Gold Advisory
Executive Summary[1]
The U.S. Departments of State, the Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, Labor, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are issuing this Advisory in light of increasingly concerning reporting related to the role of illicit actors in the gold trade, including the Wagner Group, to (i) highlight the opportunities and specific risks raised by the gold trade across sub-Saharan Africa and (ii) encourage industry participants to adopt and apply strengthened due diligence practices to ensure that such malign actors are unable to exploit and benefit from the sector, which remains essential to the livelihoods of millions of people across sub-Saharan Africa.
The gold sector is critical to the economies and communities of many sub-Saharan African countries. Building on the U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, this Advisory encourages U.S. businesses to consider responsible investment in all aspects of the sector in Africa: mining, trading, refining, manufacturing, and retail of key end products. At the same time, there are numerous risks that are directly and indirectly connected to the mining, refining, trading, and selling of gold. Without adequate due diligence and appropriate mitigating measures, an industry participant may inadvertently contribute to one or more of these risks, including conflict and terror financing, money laundering activities, sanctions evasion, human rights and labor rights abuses and environmental degradation.
While these concerns have been well known and extensively documented for many years in certain regions, such as South and North Kivu and Ituri provinces in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), newer risks in areas such as Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and elsewhere in connection with the Wagner Group have made clear the need for this Advisory. The U.S. government is committed to addressing the relationship between gold and the illicit revenue streams that contribute to and fund conflicts, corruption, and other concerns in sub-Saharan Africa. This includes development programs, sanctions actions directed at actors throughout the gold supply chain, and financial and business risk advisories.
In recent decades, the international community has made important progress toward addressing these concerns by helping industry participants identify, evaluate, and reduce risks, particularly downstream in key trading and refining centers for gold from sub-Saharan Africa such as the United Arab Emirates and Switzerland. This Advisory is not intended to replace existing due diligence guidelines, processes, or underlying reports, but rather to provide a streamlined resource that amplifies and encourages more transparent public reporting by companies implementing them.
Notwithstanding this progress, malign actors continue to exploit vulnerabilities in the gold supply chain across sub-Saharan Africa, in some cases with relative ease. Local armed groups in several conflict-affected regions have used the gold trade to finance their activities for decades, and armed entities hostile to U.S. interests are also increasing their presence in sub- Saharan Africa’s gold trade. These groups include jihadists, some with links to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State,2 as well as the Wagner Group of mercenaries under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Gold’s role as a store of value and currency, in addition to being a material used in other supply chains, further exacerbates these challenges. Industry participants should be prepared for increased U.S. government attention to the relationship between gold and these groups’ revenue streams and should be prepared for the possibility that U.S. sanctions could be used to disrupt these groups’ operations.
U.S. individuals and entities engaged with the gold sector—whether as miners, traders, refiners, exporters, users, consumers, financial institutions, or otherwise—should carefully review the risks described in this Advisory and ensure they conduct enhanced due diligence to address these risks, as appropriate and necessary. Further, they should consider, address, and report publicly on their efforts related to these risks where possible.
At the same time, U.S. persons should also explore opportunities for responsible investment in the African gold sector, including through large-scale projects and direct commercial opportunities support for the sustainable development of artisanal and small-scale mining, and due diligence innovations that enable commercially viable artisanal gold exports. Companies and U.S. persons are also encouraged to join multi-stakeholder initiatives that address these risks and release data on the impact of their individual efforts. Through these and other efforts, responsible industry participants can reduce risks and increase responsible opportunities associated with the gold industry in sub-Saharan Africa.
The key recommendations discussed in this Advisory include:
Individuals and entities engaged in the gold sector across the African continent in countries or sub-national regions where corruption may be a concern should be aware of the risks associated with doing business with corrupt actors, including potentially facilitating money laundering, the violation of economic sanctions, or other financial crimes related to corruption;
Individuals and entities doing business with the gold sector in conflict-affected countries across sub-Saharan Africa should conduct specific due diligence with respect to local communities to avoid commercial risks related to relevant red flags and reputational risks associated with contributing to conflict violence;
Individuals and entities engaged in the gold sector across the continent in countries or localities where corruption may be a concern should be aware of the risks associated with smuggling, including potentially facilitating the violation of economic sanctions, tax evasion, money laundering or other financial crimes related to smuggling;
Individuals and entities should conduct specific due diligence with respect to labor and human rights abuses to avoid commercial risks related to relevant red flags from responsible sourcing initiatives and reputational risks associated with contributing to these harms;
Individuals and entities should conduct specific due diligence with respect to environmental concerns, including mercury, cyanide, and deforestation;
Individuals and entities engaged in downstream purchases of recycled gold must ensure that they conduct due diligence on such purchases to determine whether recyclers may be introducing mined gold from sanctioned, conflict-affected, or other high-risk sources;
Individuals and entities should review available anti-money laundering typology reports carefully, including several referenced in this Advisory, in particular the lists of red flags associated with gold trading and refining, in order to identify the specific ones potentially applicable to their business. The red flags in such typology reports should be integrated into compliance programs, as appropriate, in order to avoid reputational and commercial risks related to doing business with those engaged in money laundering and terrorist financing, including violating sanctions, or prosecution for these financial crimes; and
Individuals and entities that conduct business with, materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, or in support of a sanctioned individual or entity may expose themselves to an array of consequences, such as potential designations, civil penalties, or other legal actions.
In sum, the combined objective and action expected from this Advisory is to encourage U.S. industry participants to invest responsibly in the gold sector in sub-Saharan Africa while strengthening due diligence practices and transparency in order to further restrict the ability of malign actors to exploit and profit from the sector. To that end, this Advisory proceeds in four parts.3 Part I summarizes the opportunity that the gold industry in sub-Saharan Africa represents. Part II discusses the risks associated with the gold industry on the continent, focusing first on the “upstream” extraction-related risks, and then turning to the “downstream” risks associated with value chains and distribution. Part III discusses U.S. sanctions in the context of the gold industry. Finally, Part IV discusses due diligence and best practices, focusing especially on the OECD Due Diligence Guidance adopted in 2011. The Annexes provide additional detail on existing sanctions and ongoing development projects.
[1] This advisory is explanatory only and does not have the force of law. It does not supplement or modify statutory authorities, executive orders, or regulations. It is not intended to be, nor should it be interpreted as, comprehensive or as imposing requirements under U.S. law, drawing any legal conclusions about specific fact scenarios regarding particular businesses or entities, or otherwise addressing any particular requirements under applicable law. Its sole intent is to provide information to businesses and individuals that they may consider in assessing their potential exposure to involvement with entities engaged in a range of concerns, as part of a risk-based approach to due diligence. Please see the legally binding provisions cited and other relevant legal authorities.
I. Opportunity
Africa is a major source of global gold, generating at least 870 metric tons of the precious metal – a quarter of worldwide output – in 2021. Whereas South Africa was the dominant gold producer for much of the 20th century, today gold mining is growing across the continent. ThE top five producers in 2021 were Ghana, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Sudan, according to official industry figures.4 While West Africa has emerged as a leading source of gold, countries elsewhere, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Tanzania, also have significant production. Large-scale, industrial mines, referred to as large-scale gold mining (LSGM), contribute the most significant volumes of licit gold, with the continent’s largest mines by output located in the DRC, Mali, Tanzania, and Ghana. U.S. companies are already active investors in the LSGM sector in sub-Saharan Africa, and further responsible investment in all aspects of the sector is encouraged.
[...]
III. Sanctions
The United States may use sanctions to address risks associated with the gold supply chain when such risks overlap with larger U.S. foreign policy concerns, either with respect to a particular country or broader threat. For example, the United States may (i) establish, as with sanctions programs related to Venezuela24 and Nicaragua25, a criterion for the designation of an individual or entity for operating or having operated in the gold sector of a specified country’s economy which, when used, results in the blocking of property or interests in property in the United States of the designated person and the prohibition on transactions by U.S. persons with the designated individual or entity and any entity in which the designated individual or entity has a 50% or more interest, (ii) designate individuals or entities connected to the gold trade pursuant to other sanctions criteria, if applicable, such as illicit trade in natural resources, corruption, or financing of armed groups, or (iii) prohibit, as with respect to Russia26, the importation into the United States of certain products, including gold. The U.S. State Department can also impose visa restrictions on individuals connected to a gross violation of human rights or significant corruption, including when related to the gold trade. A list of sanctions imposed in recent years with connections to gold may be found at Annex 1 of this Advisory.
Individuals and entities that conduct business with, materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, or in support of a sanctioned individual or entity may expose themselves to an array of consequences, such as potential designations, civil penalties, or other legal actions.
Case Study
Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Operations in CAR and Sudan
On September 23, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Lobaye Invest, a company that is part of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s network in CAR, which had secured gold concessions in the country. Lobaye, founded in 2017, specialized in gold and diamond extraction and is linked to Prigozhin’s Wagner Group, which is also sanctioned. The Wagner Group has been tied to human rights abuses throughout Africa.
OFAC described Prigozhin at the time as a “Kremlin-connected Russian operative” working to “advance Russia’s influence in the Central African Republic.”
This action followed earlier designations in July 2020 of Wagner Group-affiliated entities in the gold sector in Sudan, namely Meroe Gold and M Invest, as well as two individuals leading their operations. Prior to the outbreak of conflict in Sudan in April 2023, the country’s gold production has hit record levels, with open-source reporting indicating that exports to the UAE exceeded more than 18 tons in 2022.
Since the 2020 designations, Prigozhin and the Wagner Group have continued to violently advance Russia’s imperial project, both through active participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine and in various engagements across Africa. This activity has resulted in extreme violence, civilian casualties, and extensive corruption. Recent reporting indicates that the Wagner Group is working to expand its gold mining and processing operations in N’dassima in CAR, potentially earning the organization significant new income. The Wagner Group has prevented officials from visiting the region where this mine is located, raising further concerns about the extent of its operations and impact on local communities. This also allows the Wagner Group to extract and export gold outside of official channels, thus depriving CAR of royalties and other revenues.
On January 26, 2023, OFAC followed earlier designations of the Wagner Group by further designating it for malign activities in CAR and as a Transnational Criminal Organization. These sanctions targeting the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR, including gold, are intended to reduce its capacity to advance Russia’s malign influence globally. In February 2023, the European Union sanctioned Diamville, a Wagner-affiliated company in CAR, for its role in the illicit gold and diamond trades; in June 2023, OFAC designated Diamville, as well as other entities related to Wagner in CAR, including Midas Resources.
In June 2023, the U.S. government reiterated concerns regarding the connections of Wagner to combatants and the gold trade in Sudan through an Update to the May 2022 Business Risk Advisory.
Private sector actors, particularly those purchasing gold from refiners in centers such as the UAE, where open source reporting indicates gold from CAR and Sudan is sent for refining, should conduct enhanced due diligence to ensure they are not purchasing gold connected to Wagner or other Prigozhin-affiliated entities.
[24 Executive Order 13850 (Nov. 1, 2018)
25 Executive Order 13851 (Nov. 27, 2018), as amended by Executive Order 14088 (Oct. 24, 2022)
26 Executive Order 14068 (Mar. 11, 2022)]
IV. Due Diligence
Since the late 2000s, international organizations have conducted extensive investigations to identify risks across the gold sector – both in sub-Saharan Africa and throughout the world – and develop due diligence guidelines for private sector actors to implement in order to reduce these risks. In addition to the OECD, several other international and regional organizations have developed recommendations for due diligence and best practices to reduce risks in the gold sector. In addition, as discussed in more detail in Section IV.B below, U.S. precious metal dealers can be subject to U.S. AML program and reporting requirements, U.S. financial institutions27 conducting transactions involving the gold sector, including the gold supply chain, are reminded of their obligations to comply with AML and CFT regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).28
A. OECD Framework for Gold
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, formally adopted by the OECD in 2011 (the OECD published the current 3rd edition of the Guidance in 2016), provides an over-arching, five-step approach to due diligence, with Annex II of the Guidance setting out a “model” corporate policy for a responsible global supply chain. The five-step approach includes:
1. Establish strong company management systems
2. Identify and assess risk in the supply chain
3. Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks
4. Carry out independent third-party audits of supply chain due diligence at identified points in the supply chain
5. Report on supply chain due diligence
The OECD framework was recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2012 as an approved framework for due diligence reporting in the context of implementation of Dodd-Frank Section 1502. The OECD’s 2012 amendment to the Guidance added a separate Gold Supplement to focus more specific attention on the unique concerns related to gold. The OECD continues to convene actors in the gold supply chain through periodic forums and to release reports that provide additional guidance for companies and governments.
The OECD framework and Gold Supplement underpin the numerous industry frameworks discussed below and provide an overarching approach to due diligence for all companies, regardless of membership in other initiatives. These documents should be reviewed carefully by all private sector actors potentially engaged in the gold trade in or related to sub- Saharan Africa. By fully adopting the OECD’s framework, participants can make valuable progress towards reducing the upstream risks associated with the gold trade in sub-Saharan Africa.29 But notwithstanding the merits of the OECD’s guidance, additional efforts are needed for industry participants to further reduce the risks associated with their practices while ensuring that the costs are not prohibitive so as to prompt de-risking. These are covered in the sections below.
B. Anti-Money Laundering
Gold dealers and retailers conducting business in the United States and who purchased and sold more than $50,000 worth of gold in the prior calendar or tax year typically fall under the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN’s) regulations covering dealers in precious metals, precious stones, and jewels (“PMSJ dealers”).30 The regulations require PMSJ dealers to have an AML program that must include: the designation of an AML compliance officer; implementation of internal controls to prevent money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes; training; and independent testing of the program. PMSJ dealers must file with the Internal Revenue Service and FinCEN reports relating to currency in excess of $10,000,31 and may voluntarily file with FinCEN Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), commonly known in the international community as Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs). Violations of these AML requirements may result in significant monetary penalties.32
In addition, entities with ties to the U.S. financial system should be aware that U.S. financial institutions have AML/CFT compliance requirements under the BSA. In complying with these AML/CFT requirements, U.S. financial institutions are expected to take a risk-based approach to identify, assess, and mitigate the money laundering and terrorist financing risks to which they are exposed and take measures commensurate with those risks in order to mitigate them effectively. Compliance with the BSA is essential to detecting, investigating, and deterring criminal activity. The BSA imposes a range of obligations across a wide sector of financial institutions, including establishing AML programs,33 filing currency transaction reports,34 and reporting suspicious activity35 to FinCEN.
Additionally, as noted above, FATF, GIABA, and ESAAMLG, have published multiple typology documents that set out red flags for the conduct of anti-money laundering due diligence related to gold.3637
These reports identified certain “red flags”—common indicators of problematic upstream conduct—that industry participants should be aware of, avoid, and report. Such “red flags” include:
● “Licensed mines where the production has decreased with no apparent explanation.”38
● “Buying gold above market price using cash and goods (barter)”39
● “Sudden influx of gold miners into abandoned mining sites;”40
● “Making payments for minerals purchased locally to an account abroad”41
All of these “red flags” could signal an attempt to conceal the gold’s origin and its relation to illicit activity. Additionally, echoing the OECD’s guidance, the organizations
recommend that downstream industry participants commit to collecting, analyzing, certifying, and reporting information about their supply chains to ensure that their gold is not extracted from sites associated with illicit conduct.42
C. Minamata Convention
Under the Minamata Convention on Mercury, parties that have artisanal and small-scale gold mining and processing within their territory in which mercury amalgamation is used to extract gold from ore are obligated to take steps to reduce, and where feasible eliminate, the use of mercury in such activities, along with associated emissions and releases. The Convention also restricts most mercury trade. Although many sub-Saharan countries have joined the Convention, there are several significant non-parties, including the DRC, Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, and Mozambique. Parties are required to develop National Action Plans that provide a roadmap for reducing mercury use in ASGM. Many sub-Saharan countries have received support from the Global Environment Facility to address ASGM, including an inventory of mercury use, along with estimates of gold production from the sector. Relatedly, a number of development initiatives and private sector entities are working to provide mercury alternatives to ensure that mitigation of environmental concerns is possible.
D. Industry Frameworks
A number of industry organizations have developed frameworks that both their members and non-members can use to conduct due diligence against identified risks. These guidelines generally begin with an incorporation of the OECD Guidance and the Gold Supplement and then advance recommendations specific to the sector of the supply chain they apply to, whether miners, refiners, jewelers, or others. Private sector actors should review which frameworks, if any, and organizational memberships may be beneficial for them as they conduct enhanced due diligence. These initiatives include, but are not limited to:
● World Gold Council – WGC maintains the Responsible Gold Mining Principles, which include the WGC Conflict-Free Gold Standard and intends to implement the OECD Guidance and other global frameworks. In sum, the Principles seek to “address key environmental, social and governance issues for the gold mining
sector.”
● London Bullion Market Association – LBMA maintains the Responsible Sourcing Programme for member refineries. The Programme is based on the LBMA’s Responsible Gold Guidance, which states that it “follows the five-step due diligence framework set out in the OECD Guidance and requires [approved] refiners to demonstrate their efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist
financing and human rights abuses, and respect the environment globally.”
● Responsible Minerals Initiative – RMI maintains the Responsible Minerals Assurance Program, which seeks “to create the enabling conditions for companies to exercise due diligence over gold supply chains in accordance with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance” and “provides independent third-party assessments through an OECD-aligned industry mechanism for gold refiners.” Member companies come from an array of downstream sectors, including electronics, automotive, and manufacturing.
● Responsible Jewellery Council – RJC maintains the Code of Practices, which it states is the “global standard for the responsible jewelry and watch industry,
focusing on business ethics and responsible supply chains.” Member companies come from the mining, refining, trading, manufacturing, and retail sectors.
Annex 1 – Table of Recent Gold-Related Sanctions Actions
In the past five years, the United States has taken a number of sanctions actions with respect to gold and gold-related actors. In a number of cases, the sanctions action may not have been taken directly based on the individual’s or entity’s activities in the gold trade, but these are included to demonstrate the ways in which malign actors are connected to the trade. The following table includes a selection of those actions across a number of sanctions programs, including those related to certain countries in sub-Saharan Africa or other regions, e.g. Russia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Sanctions from outside sub-Saharan Africa are included for reference and as illustrations of the types of measures that can be applied to the sector. In some cases, gold-related activities may not have been the direct basis for the sanctions action taken, but the connection to the sector is relevant to note in light of the risks discussed in this Advisory. The designated persons identified below are listed for informational purposes only, as of the date of this advisory, June 27, 2003. For the current list of persons included on OFAC’s SDN List, please visit https://ofac.treasury.gov.
Date Designee Name/Description Authority Connection to the gold sector
6/27/2023 Midas Resources SARLU, Diamville SAU, and related entities E.O. 14024 Designation of entities in the Central African Republic, UAE, and Russia associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group, including with respect to Wagner’s role in CAR’s gold industry.
6/1/2023 Al Junaid Multi Activities Co. Ltd.43 E.O. 14098 Designation of an entity that operates across multiple economic sectors in Sudan, including the gold mining industry, which “has become a vital source of revenue for the [Rapid Support Forces and its leader].”
10/24/2022 Nicaraguan General Directorate of Mines44 E.O. 13851 Designation of an entity that “is an important piece of state-controlled gold operations” of which Ortega and his cronies continue to benefit.
6/28/2022 Russian Gold Importation Prohibition45 E.O. 14068 Prohibition on the importation into the United States of Russian gold to deny Russia revenue needed to fund its war in Ukraine.
6/17/2022 Ruy Delgado Lopez (Nicaragua); Empresa Nicaraguense de Minas (ENIMINAS)46 E.O. 13851 Designation of Nicaragua’s sate- owned mining company and its President to prevent Ortega’s regime form deriving benefit from its operation.
6/6/2022 Ali Qasir, Meghdad Amini; Morteza Hashemi47 E.O. 13224 Designation of leaders of a network that financed Hizballah and IRGC- QF, including through the gold trade.
6/2/2022 Nord Gold48 E.O. 14024 Designation of a major global gold mining company due to ownership by a sanctioned Russian oligarch, as part of broader effort to deprive Putin’s enablers of benefits form economic activity.
3/17/2022 African Gold Refinery in Uganda and related network49 E.O. 13413, as amended Designation of an individual, his primary company, and his derivative networks for illicit movement of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of gold and contributing to violence and instability in DRC.
2/23/2022 Said al-Jamal; Garannti Gold and Exchange50 E.O. 13224 Designation of an individual and his broader trade network—including his gold exchange—for contributing to the financing of the Houthi’s war against the Yemini government.
1/10/2022 Ramon Humberto Calderon Vindell51 E.O. 13851 Designation for being an official of the Government of Nicaragua, including for being president of the board of directors of ENIMINAS, Nicaragua’s state gold company.
9/17/2021 Omid Yazdanparast, Mohammad Ali Damirchilu, Samaneh Damirchilu, Mohammad Reza Kazemi 52 E.O. 13224 Designation of individuals and entities related to the financing of Hizballah and IRGC-QF through illicit gold activities.
9/23/2020 Prigozhin's network in CAR: Russia-based M Finans and CAR-based Lobaye Invest. Specific Individuals: Dmitry Sergeevich; Yevgeny Khodotov; Alexander Yuryevich Kuzin E.O. 13848 (and others) Designation of companies and individuals associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group.
7/15/2020 Prigozhin's Network in Sudan Entities: M Invest, Meroe Gold. Individuals: Andrei Mandel, Mikhail Potepkin, E.O. 13848 (and others) Designation of companies and individuals associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group, including with respect to Wagner’s role in Sudan’s gold industry.
9/13/2019 Kale Kayihura53 E.O. 13818 Designation of a Ugandan official for human rights abuse and corruption, including corruption related to gold smuggling.
9/10/2019 Al Hebo Jewelry Company54 E.O. 13224 Designation of a Turkish company through which ISIS converted gold into cash.
3/19/2019 VG Compania General de Mineria de Venezuela CA Minerven And Antonio Perdomo Mata55 E.O. 13850 Designation of Venezuela’s state gold mine and its president for theiR contribution to Maduro’s regime.
2/5/2019 Guidon Shimiray Mwissa56 E.O. 13413 (as amended) Designation of the founder of an armed group in the DRC (NDC-R), for—among other illicit conduct— illegally taxing gold and using revenues to purchase weapons.
11/1/2018 E.O. 13850: Venezuela, Including Gold Sector Sanctions Issuance of E.O. 13850 Authorization for broad sanctions relating to corruption in Venezuela, including specifically in the gold industry.
[43 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1514
44 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1046
45 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0838
46 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0822
47 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0806
48 https://www.state.gov/promoting-accountability-and-imposing-costs-on-the-russian-federation-and-its-enablers- for-putins-aggression-against-ukraine/; https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent- actions/20220602
49 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0664
50 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0603
51 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0552
52 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0362
53 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm775
54 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm772
55 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm631. Antonio Perdomo Mata was removed from the SDN List on March 30, 2023 (https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230330)
56 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-release/sm0279]
Annex 2 – Descriptions of Gold-Related U.S. Government-Supported Programs
[SEE PDF]
1) As is typical of such advisories, the document, in general or as it relates specifically to the OFAC portion, does not break new ground as it relates to the scope and operation of OFAC-administered sanctions laws, but it does explain evasion typologies and otherwise have implications for diligence expectations in a way that would, in a hypothetical enforcement proceeding, likely have implications for that which an alleged violator "knew of" or had a "reason to know" of (see generally General Note on the Terms "Knowingly," "Should Have Known" And "Reason to Know" In the Primary Sanctions, Secondary Sanctions and Derivative Designation Contexts (System Ed. Note)). The contents of these documents should, to the extent practicable, be absorbed into risk-based compliance programs, especially for those operating in or on the periphery of hte gold sector. OFAC would presumably consider the "Common red flags", where present, to trigger investigation expectations.
2) One notable statement contrained in the advisory is the following:
"Individuals and entities that conduct business with, materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, or in support of a sanctioned individual or entity may expose themselves to an array of consequences, such as potential designations, civil penalties, or other legal actions."
This confirms that is otherwise generally clear from the standard "materially assists" designation criterion, i.e. that it is designed to cover persons that "conduct business with" blocked persons.
3) See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581, designations issued concurrent with this advisory.