Ed. Note: if you’re new to TURBOFAC, please take note that the text string filtration function generally shouldn’t be used for terms such as “ordinarily resident,” “causing” or “new debt”. For research on the meaning of words and phrases such as those, i.e. terms central to the key legal issues in sanctions law that appear on a cross-programmatic basis, you’re typically better off locating and checking the appropriate box in the “Key Legal Issues” search category, which will limit the results to those that have been manually assessed as being relevant for the interpretation of the terms at issue.
Try typing your search term (“ordinarily resident,” “new debt,” or something else) in the “Find a Search Filter” box at the top of the page, and the corresponding “Key Legal Issues” check box will pop up instantly, if one exists. Once you check the box (e.g. “new debt,” with ~55 results), you can always use the text string filtration function to further refine your search (e.g. by typing “invoice” and narrowing the ~55 results to ~10).
Note in addition that the same applies to text string searches such as “14071” (if you’re looking for items related to EO 14071). By typing “14071” in the “Find a Search Filter” field up top, you will be able to instantly narrow the results down to items manually assessed as relating to EO 14071. Ditto terms such as “515.204” or “Iran General License G” (try the “Discrete Legal Provision” search category).
Please contact [email protected] or [email protected] with any questions on search results and efficiency.
Please click "Apply Text String Filters" again after clicking the "Close" button immediately below.
1) Compare Smith v. Trump (1:25-cv-00158) (D. Maine 2025) - OFAC/USG Memo. in Opp. to Pl. Motion for P.I.. As with the order in the Smith case, this SDNY order permanently enjoins the government from enforcing the blocking prohibition of ICC-related EO 14203 against two U.S. law professors. Similar to the Smith order, the basis for the ruling is the First Amendment, albeit with notably different reasoning.
2) In the Smith case, the judge did not reach the question of whether the prohibition was “content-based,” because it determined that, even if it was content neutral, it was not “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” (a requirement to survive “intermediate scrutiny” of content neutral regulations). In that case, the prohibition failed intermediate scrutiny because it “appear[ed] to burden substantially more speech than necessary." More...