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DICUSSION
On appeal the garnishee-banks and ACRs argue that the blocked EFTs are not attachable "assets of" Cuba under TRIA § 201. We review de novo the "threshold issue of whether EFTs are... property" of a particular party. Calderon-Cardona v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12-0075, slip op. at 12 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2014) (quoting Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2009)).
In the ordinary case, a foreign state will be "immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States" pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). Congress, however, has created terrorism-related exceptions to immunity under FSIA. See Calderon-Cardona, slip op. at 7. One such exception is TRIA’s...
1) This case illustrates the crucial difference between i) the notion of property and interests in property "of" a blocked person, which on its face entails a degree of "ownership," and ii) property "in which" a blocked person "has an interest," which is far broader, encompassing many situations in which there is no legally cognizable ownership involved.
Persons less familiar with the intricacies of sanctions laws are forgiven for believing that the typical blocking regulation, as it appears and almost all sanctions related executive orders and the typical 5XX.201 regulatory provision, requires blockable interests in property to be limited to property "of" blocked persons, because that is what those provisions say. However, as discussed in "General Note on the 300-level definition of ‘Blocked account; blocked property’ (System Ed. Note)," other parts of the typical sanctions regulationa specify that blocking regulations apply to...